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Protecting end users from security threats is an extremely difficult, but increasingly critical, problem. 
Traditional security models that focused on separating users from each other have proven ineffective 
in an environment of widespread software vulnerabilities and rampant malware. However, alternative 
approaches that provide more finely grained security generally require greater expertise than typical 
end users can reasonably be expected to have, and consequently have had limited success.
The functionality-based application confinement (FBAC) model is designed to allow end users 
with limited expertise to assign applications hierarchical and parameterised policy abstractions based 
upon the functionalities each program is intended to perform. To validate the feasibility of this 
approach and assess the usability of existing mechanisms, a usability study was conducted 
comparing an implementation of the FBAC model with the widely used Linux-based SELinux and 
AppArmor security schemes. The results showed that the functionality-based mechanism enabled 
end users to effectively control the privileges of their applications with far greater success than widely 
used alternatives. In particular, policies created using FBAC were more likely to be enforced and 
exhibited significantly lower risk exposure, while not interfering with the ability of the application to 
perform its intended task. In addition to the success of the functionality-based approach, the usability 
study also highlighted a number of limitations and problems with existing mechanisms. These results 
indicate that a functionality-based approach has significant potential in terms of enabling end users 
with limited expertise to defend themselves against insecure and malicious software.
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Controls; K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]: Security and Protection
General Terms: Security, Human Factors
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Popular operating systems, such as Windows and Unix, employ security mechanisms that 
control what each individual user may do. However, a process executed by a given user 
typically inherits all of that user’s privileges. Such access control schemes do not protect 
the user against attacks performed by the programs they run, thereby leaving users 
exposed to widespread, contemporary threats such as security vulnerabilities in their 
applications and malicious software. 
Application-oriented access control schemes exist that restrict the actions of each 
application. By specifying what each application is authorised to do, potential damage 
from a misbehaving application is significantly limited. Examples of schemes that 
provide application restrictions include: chroot, FreeBSD Jails [Kamp and Watson 2000], 
Solaris Zones [Tucker and Comay 2004], domain and type enforcement (DTE) [Badger 
et al. 1995], Role Compatibility (RC) [Ott 2002], Bitfrost [Krsti and Garfinkel 2007], 
CapDesk [Miller et al. 2004], Polaris [Stiegler et al. 2006], TRON [Berman et al. 1995], 
Virtual Machines (VMs)  [Madnick and Donovan 1973], PeaPod [Potter  et al. 2007], 
Alcatraz [Liang et al. 2009], Janus [Wagner 1999], Systrace [Provos 2002], SELinux 
[Vance and Salamon 2001], and AppArmor [Cowan et al. 2000]. These schemes can be 
divided into broad categories such as isolation-based and rule-based restrictions. 
Isolation-based application-oriented access controls simply confine the application to a 
limited name-space and isolate it from the rest of the system. Although providing a 
relatively straightforward mechanism, isolation does not suit typical user workflows 
where multiple applications need to share and exchange data. It is also often impractical 
to individually isolate all of a user’s applications as many of these schemes demand 
significant redundancy in terms of resources.
Rule-based   application-oriented   access   controls   can   enforce   least   privilege   by 
permitting programs to only access the specified resources they require to carry out their 
legitimate functions. However, this finely grained level of control often leads to complex 
policies as sophisticated applications typically require access to a myriad of resources. 
Policies for these schemes also expose the complexity of the underlying platforms and 
applications, and therefore can be very hard to create and manage without significant 
levels of expertise on the part of the user.
Despite the fact that usability has long been acknowledged as an important aspect in 
the design of security systems [Saltzer and Schroeder 1975], the topic received limited 
attention in the literature until it was demonstrated that a poorly designed security user 
interface results in degraded protection [Hitchings 1995; Zurko and Simon 1996]. 
Although awareness of the importance of usability in security design has improved 
[Cranor and Garfinkel 2005], and the literature now contains many publications related to 
computer security usability, very little research has investigated or addressed the usability 
issues associated with application restrictions. 
A study by DeWitt and Kuljis [2006] assessed the usability of the Polaris security 
mechanism [Stiegler  et al.  2006], an application-oriented access control system for 
Windows designed with usability in mind. The Polaris study involved 10 participants 
utilising that system to carry out a number of tasks. As with the usability study described 
here, their success at the tasks was evaluated and perceived usability measured. After 
using Polaris to attempt a number of tasks, participants on average rated the system 44.2 
out of 100 using the System Usability Scale (SUS) [Brooke 1996]. Consequently, the Empowering End Users to Confine Their Own Applications       0:  ● 3
study concluded that further work was necessary to improve the usability of Polaris.
The study described here makes a significant contribution to the pool of research on 
the usability issues associated with application restrictions. A comparative study was 
conducted to evaluate the usability of a  functionality-based  approach to application 
restriction, where applications are restricted based on the expected high-level behaviour 
of the program. The usability study compared a Linux-based implementation, FBAC-
LSM, with the widely deployed SELinux and AppArmor mechanisms. To date, this is the 
most comprehensive comparative usability study conducted on application confinement 
systems.
SELinux was originally developed by the US National Security Agency, and provides 
an implementation of mandatory controls for Linux. Access control decisions are made 
based on the security context resources are labelled with, combining role-based access 
control (RBAC), domain and type enforcement (DTE), and multilevel security (MLS). 
DTE forms the basis of application restrictions; rules determine the domain a program is 
associated with, and define how processes within particular domains may access 
resources labelled with specific types. Typically separate domains are specified for each 
program. A number of user-space tools to configure SELinux are available, and are 
available on Linux distributions such as Fedora. Although some management tasks can 
be achieved using GUI tools (such as the SELinux Policy Generator tool), most require 
the use of command line tools. SELinux rules can be very complex and are defined in 
terms of security contexts that are applied as labels on resources [Zanin and Mancini 
2004]. The out-of-the-box configuration for SELinux typically aims to lock down 
system-wide services and remain out of sight from end users; most of their processes run 
unconfined. While primarily aimed at expert users and security administrators, SELinux 
is the most widely deployed Linux-based security mechanism capable of application 
confinement. For many Linux users it will be the only such scheme installed on their 
system, and recent work has been aimed at improving the usability of SELinux [Athey et 
al. 2007; Nakamura et al. 2009]. In any case, its maturity and wide deployment makes it 
the archetypal Linux enhanced security mechanism and worthy of study.
AppArmor, previously known as SubDomain [Cowan et al. 2000], also implements 
mandatory controls for Linux, although using a simpler model than SELinux. AppArmor 
defines a list of resources based on resource names (such as file paths) for each restricted 
program to specify what may be accessed. Simple abstractions such as dbus, kde, and 
nameservice are used to group privileges related to particular low-level program 
characteristics and can be used when constructing policies. User-space tools to configure 
AppArmor   are   available,   including   graphical   tools   that   are   available   on   Linux 
distributions such as openSUSE. These graphical tools can be used to create and manage 
policy, including a ‘learning mode’ used to create application profiles based on the 
actions a program attempted previously. AppArmor policies can be long and detailed, 
reflecting the underlying complexity of the confined applications and the various 
platform layers these depend on. At one stage an online repository was available for users 
to share the application profiles they had created. AppArmor has been presented by 
Novell as an easier to use alternative to SELinux, with a focus on providing mandatory 
application-oriented controls [Novell n.d.]. 
FBAC-LSM takes a different approach: applications are confined based on the 
functionalities they are expected to perform [Schreuders and Payne 2008a]. FBAC-LSM 0: 4 ● Z.C. Schreuders, T. McGill, and C. Payne
is an implementation of the functionality-based application confinement (FBAC) model
1. 
The   FBAC   model   provides   both   mandatory   and   discretionary   controls,   allowing 
administrators and end users to define policies that are simultaneously enforced. This 
enables administrators and users to restrict applications in order to enforce their 
respective security goals. Policy abstractions, known as  functionalities,  are used to 
authorise programs to access resources. Functionalities model the privilege requirements 
of high-level application features such as “Web Browser”, “Image Editor”, or “Game” 
[Schreuders and Payne 2008b]. 
Functionalities  are parameterised, which enables them to adapt to each program’s 
specific needs. Application policies can specify arguments to the parameters of the 
functionalities  assigned.  These  arguments   can  be   passed  in  a   fashion  similar  to 
subroutines in programming languages.  Parameters can describe application-specific 
details such as the location of files, directories, or network resources. For example, 
parameters may specify where an application stores its configuration files, the location 
the user intends to store files created using the application, or the hosts the application is 
authorised to communicate with.
Functionalities are also hierarchical; that is, they can contain other functionalities. 
Functionality hierarchies enable  further policy modularity, and can provide layers of 
abstraction and encapsulation. For example, the high-level “Web Browser” functionality 
includes functionalities representing lower-level policy details, such as “HTTP client”. 
As FBAC-LSM policies are defined in terms of hierarchical functionalities, low-level 
details are abstracted, and an overview of the policy can be presented to the user in terms 
of high-level security goals.
FBAC is designed to abstract policy details away from users and enable them to 
specify what applications are authorised to do based on high-level and conceptually 
simple goals. To restrict a program, functionalities that describe the behaviour expected 
of the application are assigned and any parameters then specified.
The FBAC model can facilitate automation of certain stages of policy construction. 
The implementation provides a graphical policy manager tool that steps users through the 
process of defining application policies and performs automation where possible. The 
policy manager can suggest functionalities and parameter arguments based on analysis of 
the program and filesystem. Since manually specifying parameter argument values can 
require knowledge of the applications being confined (such as where configuration files 
are stored), this automation can further reduce the expertise required to manage the 
security scheme. Unlike most other rule-based application-oriented access controls, 
policies are created a priori: without needing applications to be first executed in order to 
generate confinement policy. FBAC-LSM includes a learning mode for situations where 
application policies do not provide all the privileges necessary.
Each of these three schemes allows users to restrict the actions of applications. The 
Linux security module (LSM) framework, as currently implemented, only allows a single 
security mechanism to be enabled at a time on a Linux system. Therefore users must 
choose between these security systems if they wish to confine their applications with one 
of these schemes.
1  FBAC-LSM is free open source software available at: http://schreuders.org/FBAC-LSMEmpowering End Users to Confine Their Own Applications       0:  ● 5
2 EXPERIMENTAL OBJECTIVES
The usability study described here was designed to evaluate the usability of the FBAC 
approach relative to the two most mature and widely deployed Linux enhanced security 
modules, SELinux and AppArmor, and their configuration tools
2. This was the first 
formal comparative usability study to examine any of these systems. Where possible the 
three systems were compared to each other, and the effects of the different approaches 
taken by each were investigated. 
Although application-oriented access controls can be shipped with predefined policies 
specified by third parties that restrict specific known programs, this study focuses on the 
ability to specify policies that allow users or administrators to protect themselves against 
potentially unknown applications and enforce their own security goals. 
In particular, the following aspects of usability and security were measured and 
analysed:
1. User perceptions of the usability of the three confinement schemes;
2. User success at creating and applying confinement policies;
3. Ability of user-confined programs to continue to execute as expected;
4. Overall risk exposure after confinement;
5. Ability to successfully restrict well-behaved programs;
6. Ability to successfully restrict malicious programs;
7. Time-efficiency of the three confinement schemes.
3 METHOD
The usability study employed a within-subjects design. Participants used all three security 
mechanisms   to  construct   policies  to  confine  two  programs.   Participants  provided 
feedback regarding security system usability and preference, and the security properties 
of the resulting policies were analysed. 
3.1 Participant Recruitment
Participants were primarily recruited from the information technology students at an 
Australian university, members of a Linux user group and an information security 
association. Participant recruitment targeted people who had previously used Linux 
systems, although this was not a requirement for participation. Participants were recruited 
using flyers on university notice boards, announcements in lectures and via email. A 
prize of an 8GB iPod Nano was used to encourage participation, and was awarded to a 
participant chosen at random.
A convenience sample of 46 people was used, made up of every potential participant 
available during the study period. Seven of those people left before completing the 
experiment and were excluded from analysis, leaving 39 participants considered during 
analysis. The size of this sample compares favourably with that of the earlier Polaris 
study [DeWitt and Kuljis 2006].
3.2 Environment and Logistics
The study was conducted over a number of sessions in a university computer laboratory, 
with between one and 10 subjects participating at a time. In order to ensure consistent 
dissemination of information, most information presented to participants was pre-
recorded and was presented via video files launched via batch scripts on the computer. 
2  This study considers the usability of the schemes in terms of configuration which is done via 
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Participants were assigned individual copies of three Virtual Machines (VMs) setup for 
use with the three security systems. Since no single distribution supported all the user-
space tools, the Linux distributions used for each of the systems were those with the most 
complete support for the security systems studied: Fedora 11 for SELinux and openSUSE 
11.1 for AppArmor. openSUSE 10.3 was used for FBAC-LSM, since that was its 
development environment. Each of the environments were configured to look alike. 
Access to the VMs was via batch scripts that used VMWare player to run the appropriate 
VM, and logged the time VMs were started and when participants were finished. Each 
participant’s VMs were then stored for later analysis.
3.3 Preparation
Participants were randomly assigned an order for using the three security systems to 
remove any biasing due to learning effects [Greenwald 1976]. Participants were supplied 
with headphones and the following hand outs:
· An ID and the order in which they were to use the three systems.
· Welcome page, system use, and task scenario information.
· A copy of the Filesystem Hierarchy Standard (FHS) reference. The complete 
FHS v2.3 was available as a PDF file on the lab computers
3.
· A Unix/Linux command reference
4.
A short presentation explained the various handouts and how to access the videos and 
VMs via the scripts. Participants were prompted to record their ID on the computers they 
were using to facilitate the collection and collation of data. The time constraints were also 
explained: participants were encouraged to spend a maximum of approximately one hour 
on each system, with a total maximum experiment time, including feedback, of four 
hours
5. Participants were encouraged to ask for help if they were stuck on a task (as they 
might do in a workplace environment). Participants were also asked to notify the 
moderator if they encountered unrelated technical problems; for example, if a VM were 
to crash. Participants were then prompted to watch the introductory video. This video 
explained the goal of application confinement, and provided further details as to how the 
experiment would be run. As was explained in the video, the sequence of the experiment 
was as follows:
• Viewing of the introductory video
• Pre-experiment questionnaire
• Linux filesystem video
• For each security mechanism:
– Mechanism videos
– Confining the programs
– Post-task questionnaire
• Post-experiment questionnaire
3  Available from http://www.pathname.com/fhs/
4  Available from http://fosswire.com/-post/2007/8/unixlinux-command-
cheat-sheet/
5  This relatively generous maximum timeframe was intended as a rough guide for participants 
based on the time taken during the pilot study, and was intended to avoid disadvantaging 
SELinux, which during the pilot study took the longest to complete. Many participants finished 
sooner than these guidelines. Participants were provided with refreshments and in general seemed 
to remain receptive and responsive throughout.Empowering End Users to Confine Their Own Applications       0:  ● 7
• Debriefing
The pre-experiment questionnaire was used to identify demographic characteristics of 
participants. Information collected included self-assessed expertise and experience. Each 
of the participants rated their computer skill, knowledge of computer security, knowledge 
of Linux, and knowledge of how files are organised on Linux on semantic differential 
scales. The frequency with which they had used Linux was recorded using a multiple 
choice question. 
The filesystem video elaborated on the FHS reference handout, illustrating the 
directory hierarchy on an example Linux system. This familiarised the participants with 
the Linux directory structure. This knowledge would assist participants in utilising each 
of the three mechanisms being compared, and ensured a minimal level of awareness 
about the way files are organised on a Linux system.
Before participants used each system, they watched a video describing the way the 
security system worked and a demonstration of configuring the system. Each explanation 
video covered the same level of detail: describing policy components, how policy is 
represented on disk, the states that policies for applications can be in (either enforced or 
not), an overview of the steps involved in confining an application, and a list of helpful 
commands. Another video for each system gave a demonstration of creating a policy to 
confine the KWrite program as an example. When participants were ready to start 
learning about each system, they were given a hardcopy of the demonstration script so 
they could more quickly access the information without re-watching the video. 
3.4 Tasks
Information about the programs to be confined was presented to the group on the task 
scenario   handouts   (Appendix   A)   and   during   the   initial   talk.   Using   each   of   the 
mechanisms in the random order allocated, participants consecutively created security 
policies for these programs with the goal of restricting the ability of each program to act 
maliciously, while allowing the programs to operate as described in the scenarios. At no 
point were participants given any indication that FBAC-LSM had been created by one of 
the authors.
The programs that the participants endeavoured to confine were the Opera web 
browser and a simulation of a Trojan horse posing as a Tetris game, KSirtet, which was 
downloaded from an unauthenticated website. Participants were informed they should 
allow Opera to browse the web, chat using IRC, and download files, while KSirtet should 
be permitted to operate as a game. 
Both of these scenarios were designed to pose realistic risks and this was explained in 
the information presented to participants during the introduction video and on the 
scenario sheet.  As  web browsers interact  with external  untrusted  hosts, software 
vulnerabilities could lead to an attacker taking control of the program. A game 
originating from an unauthenticated source could be malicious code posing as a 
legitimate program. The section below describes how each of the security systems can be 
configured by end users.
3.4.1 Steps Involved
Using the tools typically available on an SELinux-enabled system (where possible using 
graphical tools), specifying a new application policy module usually involves using the 0: 8 ● Z.C. Schreuders, T. McGill, and C. Payne
Policy Generator GUI tool to create a barebones skeleton policy. Using this tool involves 
specifying the executable path, selecting ports and low-level application traits (as 
illustrated in Fig. 1), and manually specifying any directories or files the application 
manages. 
Fig. 1: SELinux Policy Generator specifying low level application traits
This process generates a policy module that is by default permissive (not enforced) and 
incomplete. Next, a number of command line tools need to be used, and the program 
being confined needs to be run, to generate the detailed rules that authorise the program 
to access the resources it requires to run. Fig. 2 illustrates using command line tools to 
generate additional rules based on previous program activity. Subsequently, the .te file 
needs to be manually edited to put the domain into an enforced mode and the policy 
needs to be compiled and loaded into effect. Command line tools can be re-run to add any 
further rules.
Fig. 2: SELinux command line configuration
Using the  YAST AppArmor Add Profile Wizard GUI tool involves the following 
steps. First, the user specifies the name of the application to be confined. Next, the user is 
prompted to run the program. After the user has used the program, they are asked to 
review and vet (either allowing or denying) each of the low-level rules that would allow 
the program to behave the same way in the future. Fig. 3 illustrates the process of vetting 
the previous actions of an application using the Add Profile Wizard. The user is then 
presented with a text file view of the policy they have created. Depending on the way the 
tool is used the profile may be placed in effect, or remain in an unenforced state, in which 
case the user can use the AppArmor Control Panel GUI to put the profile into an enforced 
mode. The Update Profile Wizard can be used to add further rules.Empowering End Users to Confine Their Own Applications       0:  ● 9
Fig. 3: AppArmor Add Profile Wizard vetting previous program activity
Using the FBAC-LSM Policy Manager GUI tool to specify application policies 
involves the following steps. First, the user starts the Add Application Wizard, and 
specifies the name of the application being confined. Next, the executable paths are 
specified, which the wizard attempts to automatically detect. The type of program 
(technically the base-level functionally for the program), either command line or 
graphical is specified, this is typically  suggested automatically and accurately. As 
illustrated in Fig. 4, the tool then performs some analysis and suggests likely high-level 
functionalities that describe the features the application performs. The user selects which 
functionalities apply, taking the suggestions into consideration.0: 10 ● Z.C. Schreuders, T. McGill, and C. Payne
Fig. 4: FBAC-LSM Policy Manager functionality suggestions
Then, for each of the functionalities, the argument values are specified for parameters. 
These specify all the application-specific information that allows the functionalities to 
adapt to the needs of the programs being confined. Depending on the purpose of each 
parameter, they can take the form of files, directories, ports, or IP addresses. In most 
user-independent   cases   (such   as   identifying   the   locations   of   application-specific 
configuration files), after some analysis the wizard can automatically suggest values, 
which the user can edit or accept. User-dependent cases (such as where the user chooses 
to store their own files) are specified manually by the user. Fig. 5 illustrates the interface 
for specifying parameter arguments. After specifying values for all the parameters, the 
user chooses the name for the policy file in which the policy is stored. The user can then 
review the application policy that they have created in a number of ways. The user then 
saves the policy and loads it into effect using the Policy Manager main dialog. The 
learning mode can be used to add further privileges to the application profile.Empowering End Users to Confine Their Own Applications            0: ●  
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Fig. 5: FBAC-LSM Policy Manager parameter argument specification
The tasks in the usability study were intentionally challenging for FBAC-LSM and, as 
mentioned,   they   posed   realistic   situations   and   threats.   As   with   the   majority   of 
applications that have been studied, the automation provided by the FBAC-LSM policy 
manager assisted the user [Schreuders et al. 2011]. However, in order to meet all the 
requirements in the task scenario, the user had to deviate from the suggestions and also 
manually provide some details. For Opera, the FBAC-LSM policy manager suggested the 
functionality “Web Brower”, and the user should have also specified “IRC Client”. For 
KSirtet,   the   policy   manager   suggested   both   “Game”   and   “Network   Game” 
functionalities, although KSirtet only required the “Game” functionality to function 
legitimately, since multiplayer features were provided locally with players sharing the 
keyboard. Details such as the location for authorised Opera file downloads were specified 
by the user.
3.5 Trojan Horse Simulation
For the purposes of the experiment, the KSirtet Tetris game was modified to simulate a 
Trojan horse. The modified program attempts to access many resources that a game 
should not need to and, as a malicious program, would represent a serious security 
problem. Such a program should require very limited privileges to run. However, without 
the use of an application confinement security mechanism such as those studied, such a 
program would possess all of a user’s privileges. In addition to attacks that could be 
performed on a correctly configured Linux system, the Trojan horse simulation also 
attempts to access resources normally protected by discretionary access controls (DAC). 
For the purposes of the experiment, the VMs were deliberately misconfigured to allow 
this access. This type of configuration could be caused by user error, malicious actions 
from other programs, or be standard on single user Linux systems such as embedded 
devices. This aspect of the experimental design was intended to illustrate the potential for 
application-oriented access controls to provide defence-in-depth as additional layers of 
security. 0: 12 ● Z.C. Schreuders, T. McGill, and C. Payne
The list of malicious activity attempted by the Trojan simulation was developed to 
reflect a range of risks and malicious behaviour that could compromise a Linux system. 
These risks include privacy risks and system-wide or user-level compromise. Appendices 
B and C describe the activities the Trojan simulation attempted.
3.6 Measuring Perceived Usability
Perceived system usability was measured using Brooke’s [1996] System Usability Scale 
(SUS), which is a widely employed and extensively verified tool [Bangor et al. 2008; 
Lewis and Sauro 2009]. The SUS is a 10 item Likert scale, with even-numbered items 
worded negatively and odd-numbered items worded positively. The scale yields a single 
score ranging from 0 to 100, representing an assessment of the system’s usability. After 
using each security system, participants completed the SUS questionnaire. 
After they had used all three systems, participants completed a final questionnaire 
ranking the three systems in terms of how easy they were to use, how easy they were to 
understand and how likely they would be to use them again. Once participants had 
completed the exercises and questionnaires, they were taken into a separate room and the 
security systems were discussed in a debriefing session where additional opinions were 
collected.
3.7 Measuring Policy Quality and Task Success
The VMs from each participant were stored for subsequent data collection. Data 
collection involved testing the ability of the confined programs to run and the ability of 
the programs to access the security sensitive resources the Trojan horse attempted to use. 
Each program was tested manually to assess whether it could run and that all required 
features operated correctly. Whether or not policies were successfully created was also 
assessed manually. To determine the threats the programs still posed, the Opera and 
KSirtet executables on each VM were replaced with an assessment program that 
attempted to access the same resources as the Trojan simulation. While retaining the 
policies created by participants, the replacement scoring program output the result of 
each access attempt. These results showed whether the confined program was able to 
potentially act maliciously. Additionally, time-on-task was recorded. All data was stored 
in a database for statistical analysis. 
3.8 Pilot Study
The study was carefully designed to eliminate potential biasing factors. For example, the 
order in which participants used the systems was randomised, the names of the systems 
studied were not advertised during participant recruitment, and participants were not 
allowed to search the Internet for information about the systems during the study. FBAC-
LSM had not been released prior to conducting the experiment, and those already aware 
of it did not participate.
A pilot study was conducted with four participants, who had a range of expertise 
levels. The primary concern of the pilot study was to detect the potential for participant 
bias. The pilot group completed an additional pilot questionnaire regarding whether they 
noticed anything potentially biasing in the videos, presentations, and handouts supplied 
during the experiment. They were also interviewed during the debriefing. The pilot group 
reported no biasing factors. The pilot study did raise awareness of a number of technical 
problems, such as networking problems, missing codecs for video playback, and missing 
sound in one of the videos. All these issues were resolved prior to conducting the main Empowering End Users to Confine Their Own Applications            0: ●  
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study.
4 RESULTS
One   way   repeated   measures   analysis   of   variance   (ANOVA),  the   non-parametric 
Friedman test, repeated measures logistic regression, and descriptive statistics were 
utilised to compare the within-subjects effects of the three security systems, SELinux, 
AppArmor, and FBAC-LSM.
4.1 Participant Demographics
Participants’ ages  ranged from 18 to 67 (mean: 31.1 std. deviation: 13.0). Five 
participants   were   female.  Table   I  summarises   the   self-reported   expertise   of   the 
participants, collected using the pre-experiment questionnaire. In each case responses 
could range from one to seven, with higher values representing higher levels of 
experience or expertise. As shown in the table, the majority of participants evaluated 
themselves as possessing above average computer skill, with a relatively wide range of 
responses for the computer security and Linux questions. As recommended for usability 
studies, the experiment included some  least competent users  (LCU); that is, users 
representing the minimum level of expertise that would be expected to utilise the systems 
[Rubin and Chisnell 2004]. The study also included some Linux and computer security 
experts, who work within industry managing Linux systems and providing IT security 
services. 
Table I: Participant self assessment
Expertise Mean Std dev Min Max
Skill with computers 5.82 0.90 3 7
Knowledge of computer security 4.47 1.20 2 7
Frequency of Linux use 4.24 2.32 1 7
Knowledge of Linux 3.53 1.89 1 7
Knowledge of FHS 3.61 1.97 1 7
4.2 Preference Evaluation – System Usability Scale
A one-way within subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of security 
system on SUS. The assumptions of the test were met. There was a significant effect of 
security system, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.38, F (2,35) = 28.99, p < .001, n=37. The effect size 
was .624.  Post hoc analysis using the Tukey LSD test showed significant contrasts 
between each pairwise comparison. That is, all three systems were significantly different 
from each other in terms of perceived usability. 
As illustrated in  Fig. 6, on average FBAC-LSM received the highest SUS scores 
(M=70.21, SD=18.34), followed by AppArmor (M=54.93, SD=24.18), and SELinux with 
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Fig. 6: Box plot comparing SELinux, AppArmor and FBAC-LSM System Usability 
Scale scores
4.3 Preference Evaluation – Ranking
Table II shows the mean rank (one, first, to three, last) for each system in terms of: how 
easy they were to use, how easy they were to understand, and how likely participants 
would be to use them again. In each case, FBAC-LSM was, on average, ranked highest, 
followed   by   AppArmor,   then   SELinux.   FBAC-LSM   was   also   ranked   first   most 
frequently, and SELinux was ranked last most frequently. A post hoc analysis confirmed 
that the order in which the systems were used did not influence these rankings.
Table II: Mean ranks
Security 
system
Mean rank 
for ease of 
use 
Mean rank for 
ease of 
understanding
Mean rank 
for likeliness 
of reuse
SELinux 2.67 2.64 2.58
AppArmor 1.85 1.90 1.92
FBAC-LSM 1.49 1.46 1.45
The results of the SUS score differences and ranks showed that FBAC-LSM exhibited 
higher perceived usability than AppArmor and SELinux. 
4.4 Performance Evaluation – Creation of Policies
In this section the extent to which participants were able to create policies to confine the 
programs is reported. The quality of the policies created is described in subsequent 
sections. The following results (including percentages) do not include participant records 
with “missing values” due to:
· Seven SELinux virtual machines that froze at start-up with a SELinux AVC 
message. This problem appeared to be the result of SELinux rules, created by 
participants, that inadvertently no longer allowed the VMs to start.
· Two VMs (one SELinux, one AppArmor) that did not start due to kernel panics. 
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· Existing SELinux rules for KSirtet which conflicted with the creation of a new 
policy to confine KSirtet. Due to the abstruseness of the command-line output 
that   reports   this   conflict,   the   problem   was   not   detected   during   initial 
environment setup, the pilot study, or by the majority of participants. After the 
problem   was   detected,   it   was   remedied   for   the   subsequent   participants. 
Therefore 22 participants could not create a policy to confine KSirtet due to this 
conflict. Ironically, the default policy did not provide any protection against the 
threats tested during the study.
As policies  were either successfully created or not,  repeated measures logistic 
regression was conducted to compare the effect of security system on the creation of 
enforced policies for Opera. There was a significant effect of security system, Wald Chi-
Square (2, N=105) = 31.30, p < .001. All three systems were significantly different from 
each other in terms of how many policies for Opera were successfully created and 
enforced. As shown in the Enforced Policy column of Table III, 90% of participants 
created enforced policies for Opera using FBAC-LSM, 66% using AppArmor, and only 
23% using SELinux.
Table III: Policy creation rates for Opera and KSirtet using SELinux, AppArmor, and 
FBAC-LSM
Security 
System
Application No Policy
(unconfined)
Unenforced 
Policy
(unconfined)
Enforced 
Policy
SELinux Opera 
(n=31)
21 (68%) 3 (10%) 7 (23%)
KSirtet 
(n=9)
6 (67%) 1 (11%) 2 (22%)
AppArmor Opera 
(n=38)
3 (8%) 10 (26%) 25 (66%)
KSirtet 
(n=38)
7 (18%) 4 (11%) 27 (71%)
FBAC-
LSM
Opera 
(n=39)
4 (10%) 0 (0%) 35 (90%)
KSirtet 
(n=39)
7 (18%) 0 (0%) 32 (82%)
Repeated measures logistic regression was also conducted to compare the effect of the 
security system on the creation of enforced policies for KSirtet using each of the security 
systems. Again, there was a significant effect of security system, Wald Chi-Square (2, 
N=86) = 10.03, p = .007. As with Opera policies, all three systems were significantly 
different from each other: 82% of participants created enforced policies for KSirtet using 
FBAC-LSM, 71% using AppArmor, and only 22% using SELinux.
In both tasks it was notable that participants were most likely to successfully create 
policies to confine applications using FBAC-LSM. In addition to participants who were 
not successful at creating a policy at all (refer to the No Policy column in Table III), 
SELinux and AppArmor resulted in a number of policies that were left in an unenforced 
state. The terminology for an unenforced policy differs for each system – SELinux: 
permissive   domain,   AppArmor:   complaining   mode,   FBAC-LSM:   complaining   or 
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despite the fact that a policy exists. Although participants had seen videos describing the 
way policy enforcement works for each system, it is possible that many participants were 
unaware these policies were in an unenforced state. As illustrated in the Unenforced 
Policy column, a number of SELinux and AppArmor policies for both Opera and KSirtet 
were not in an enforced state. In contrast, 100% of the policies created using FBAC-LSM 
were in an enforced state.
4.5 Performance Evaluation – Confined Applications Can Run
As shown in Table IV and Table V, the extent to which the confined programs can 
actually operate is affected by the security system. Using FBAC-LSM 97% of the 
policies created for Opera allowed the program to run, compared to 56% and 43% for 
AppArmor and SELinux respectively. These results demonstrate that,  compared to 
AppArmor and SELinux, FBAC-LSM is more successful at not interfering with programs 
performing   their   legitimate   functions.   This   is   an   important   practical   measure   of 
application confinement success, as a security mechanism or policy that disrupts the 
operation of a program is likely to be promptly disabled.
Table V shows that 100% of FBAC-LSM policies for KSirtet allowed the program to run, 
as opposed to 70% of AppArmor policies. However, only 31% of FBAC-LSM policies 
allowed the program to record high scores in the user’s home directory. This did not 
affect game-play and was due to the fact that the score file did not necessarily exist when 
the policy was created. Of the nine participants not affected by the policy conflict 
described in Section 4.4, only two participants created policies for KSirtet using 
SELinux, both of which allowed the game to run.
Table IV: Extent to which Opera can function while confined by SELinux, AppArmor, 
and FBAC-LSM
Access to feature
(Opera)
SELinux
(n=7)
AppArmor
(n=25)
FBAC-LSM
(n=35)
Program runs 3 (43%) 14 (56%) 34 (97%)
Can   access   web   pages 
via HTTP
3 (43%) 14 (56%) 34 (97%)
Can   access   web   pages 
via HTTPS
3 (43%) 13 (52%) 34 (97%)
Can access IRC 1 (14%) 8 (32%) 19 (54%)
Table V: Extent to which KSirtet can function while confined by SELinux, AppArmor, 
and FBAC-LSM
Access to feature 
(KSirtet)
SELinux
(n=2)
AppArmor
(n=27)
FBAC-LSM
(n=32)
Program runs 2 (100%) 19 (70%) 32 (100%)
Can play game 2 (100%) 19 (70%) 32 (100%)
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4.6 Performance Evaluation – Risk Exposure
4.6.1 Overall Risk Exposure
Risk exposure was measured using a simple score, one demerit point for each security 
sensitive resource that was accessible for each of the two programs. This measure was 
designed to give a clear indication of the effect of the security system on the exposure to 
threats by simply recording the number of realistic threats the systems remained exposed 
to, rather than attempting to subjectively weight each threat. The nonparametric Friedman 
test was conducted to compare the effect of security system on the overall risk exposure. 
This test was used as an alternative to one-way within subjects ANOVA to ensure that 
violations of the assumptions of ANOVA did not impact on the interpretation of the 
results. Analysis included the data from participants who participated after the SELinux 
KSirtet default policy conflict was detected and resolved. There was a significant effect 
of security system, χ
2(2) = 36.32, p < 0.001. Post hoc analysis was conducted using the 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test with a Bonferroni correction applied. This  showed that 
FBAC-LSM (M=14.3, SD=9.7) had a significantly lower risk exposure than both 
AppArmor (M=30.3, SD=17.0) and SELinux (M=43.0, SD=12.0). AppArmor was also 
found to have a significantly lower risk exposure than SELinux. A post hoc analysis 
confirmed that the order in which the systems were used did not influence risk exposure. 
Appendix B gives further detail regarding the types of access permitted by each security 
system.
These results allow comparison between the level of protection each system provided 
in terms of user success at creating and enforcing correctly configured policies using each 
of the systems. As illustrated in Fig. 7, SELinux was the least successful at reducing risk 
exposure. AppArmor had the highest degree of variation, resulting in a broad range of 
risk exposure values, from policies that did not allow anything to policies that gave 
unrestricted access. Overall AppArmor averaged second most successful at reducing risk 
exposure. AppArmor’s average score still indicates its policies exposed the user to high 
degrees of risk by allowing the programs undue access to resources. FBAC-LSM was 
both the most consistent, and provided the greatest protection. These results demonstrated 
that, compared to the other systems, FBAC-LSM resulted in the lowest overall risk 
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Fig. 7: Box plot comparing SELinux, AppArmor and FBAC-LSM overall risk exposure
4.6.2 Opera Risk Exposure When Policies Exist
The nonparametric Friedman test was also used to compare the effect of security system 
on the Opera risk exposure. Risk exposure was measured using a simple score, one 
demerit point for each security sensitive resource that was accessible to Opera. Analysing 
the data from participants who created an enforced policy for Opera using all three 
systems (n=5) showed no significant effect of security system , χ
2(2) = 5.06, p = 0.080. 
This was repeated analysing the participants who created an enforced policy for Opera 
using AppArmor and FBAC-LSM (n=23) to compare the effect of security system on the 
Opera risk exposure using these two systems. An effect was detected, χ
2(1) = 7, p = 
0.008. This result indicates that, when policies for Opera were successfully created and 
enforced AppArmor policies were slightly more restrictive (M=4.65, SD=3.19) than 
those created using FBAC-LSM (M=7.83, SD=1.72). Both of these scores represent a 
significant reduction in exposure to risk, although FBAC-LSM authorised additional 
network access. However, only 57% of those AppArmor profiles actually allowed Opera 
to function, compared to 96% of the FBAC-LSM policies, which allowed Opera to run 
while reducing exposure to risks. Also, in practice there would be a difference in risk 
exposure between the three mechanisms due to FBAC-LSM’s greater success at creating 
and enforcing policies. All three systems when successfully deployed to confine a non-
malicious application reduced the exposure to risk.
4.6.3 Trojan Horse Risk Exposure When Policies Exist
Due to the low number of participants who created an enforced policy for KSirtet using 
SELinux (n=2), there was insufficient residual degrees of freedom to compare the effect 
of security system on the KSirtet risk exposure using all three systems. Instead,  a 
Friedman test was conducted to compare the effect of security system on the KSirtet risk 
exposure using only AppArmor and FBAC-LSM. Risk exposure was measured in the 
same way as previously, one demerit point for each accessible security sensitive resource. 
Security system was found to have a significant effect, χ
2(1) = 5.26, p = 0.022. Therefore 
in the case of malicious programs, the results showed that FBAC-LSM (M=6.04, 
SD=4.96) is likely to be superior in producing more secure confinement policies than 
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Unlike in the case of Opera, the Trojan program KSirtet was attempting to behave 
maliciously. AppArmor policies are often built by the mechanism of observing program 
behaviour and having users review the rules generated from this. Therefore, successful 
confinement relies on the user’s ability to vet the actions of potentially misbehaving 
programs. FBAC-LSM on the other hand constructs policy based on the features the user 
wants the program to perform, and on the location of various application specific 
resources. These results indicate that users typically do not have the expertise necessary 
to vet the actions of programs as required by AppArmor. In contrast, the FBAC approach 
was found to be far more accessible by users, and thereby achieved greater levels of 
protection. 
It is expected that, had more participants successfully created policies for KSirtet using 
SELinux, SELinux would have rated even worse than AppArmor. The user-space tools 
for SELinux automatically enumerate all the learned rules, and there is no GUI tool that 
assists users with the vetting process.
4.7 Performance Evaluation – Efficiency
To compare the effect of security system on the overall time-on-task, a Friedman test was 
conducted. Time-on-task was defined as the time spent using each security system, and 
was measured in minutes based on the start and end times as recorded by the batch 
scripts. There was a statistically significant effect of security system, χ
2(2) = 14.45, p = 
0.001. Post hoc analysis was conducted using the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test with a 
Bonferroni correction applied. This showed there was a significant difference in the time-
on-task for AppArmor (M=29.3, SD=14.3), which was significantly less than SELinux 
(M=45.18, SD=19.0), and also significantly less than FBAC-LSM (M=40.1, SD=15.8). 
No significant difference in time-on-task was found between SELinux and FBAC-LSM. 
This indicates that participants completed the tasks faster using AppArmor than the other 
two systems. During the study it was  observed that, when faced with repetitive 
AppArmor dialogs with rules to vet, some participants simply clicked “Allow” as fast as 
possible for each rule, and this appears to explain the shorter completion time using 
AppArmor. 
Two scales for each system were used to gauge the perceived time efficiency of the 
three systems. These results are in contrast to the actual time-on-tasks. On average 
participants rated FBAC-LSM as the most time efficient. The majority of participants 
indicated that they felt they had enough time to use AppArmor and FBAC-LSM. 
Participants indicated a more varied response (SD=2.22) regarding whether they had 
enough time to use SELinux; on average response was relatively neutral (M=3.90). Study 
participants   occasionally   encountered   reliability   issues   with   the   new   FBAC-LSM 
implementation. The moderator stated that any crashes were not the participant’s fault, 
and asked them to restart the VM. Any saved policies were not lost. These problems did 
not appear to have a notable impact on user perception of the system. 
5 DISCUSSION
The results of the usability study showed that, compared to AppArmor and SELinux, 
FBAC-LSM was rated and ranked as easiest to use, had significantly higher rates of 
policy creation and enforcement, had more policies that allowed the programs being 
confined to run and function correctly, and most reduced the risk to the user. While 
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confining   the   Opera   web   browser   to   protect   against   vulnerabilities,   the   study 
demonstrated that users were more likely to successfully construct and enforce these 
policies, reducing the risk overall. Furthermore, FBAC-LSM policies provided far more 
protection against potential malware then either of the other two mechanisms. Users 
reported  preferring  FBAC-LSM  from  a  time  efficiency  point  of view.  However, 
AppArmor confinement  procedures  were sometimes recorded as taking less time, 
apparently   due   to   users   rapidly   clicking   through   dialogues   without   necessarily 
considering the message that was presented to them. These results will now be discussed 
in detail.
5.1 Perceived Usability
Based on their research, Bangor et al. have published advice for interpreting SUS results 
[2008], that  suggests that “products with scores less than 50 should be cause for 
significant concern and are judged to be unacceptable”. SELinux scored 34.58, which 
suggests that SELinux suffers from major usability deficiencies and is in need of 
significant usability improvements. Based on observations made during the experiment, 
the primary factors limiting SELinux usability seem to be due to the complexity of the 
model used and the lack of an intuitive graphical interface for much of the task of policy 
specification. While SELinux is arguably intended to be configured by those with 
significant expertise, its widespread deployment on Linux systems, including personal 
workstations, means these usability results cannot be ignored. If the scheme itself is 
deemed to be fundamentally unsuited to being managed by end users, an alternative, 
user-friendly approach may be better suited.
AppArmor scored 54.93. According to Bangor et al., “products with scores less than 
70 should be considered candidates for increased scrutiny and continued improvement 
and should be judged to be marginal at best”. This suggests that, while AppArmor is 
significantly preferred over SELinux in terms of usability, improvements are required in 
order for it to be considered ‘acceptable’. Based on observations during the study, the 
primary factor limiting AppArmor usability seems to be due to the inability of typical 
users to make informed decisions about the files to which applications require access. 
This result supports the notion that end users cannot be expected to have the expertise to 
make low-level decisions about what access privileges their programs require.
Bangor et al. suggest that “products which are at least passable have scores above 70”. 
Based on these interpretation guidelines, FBAC-LSM, with a score of 70.21, is the only 
system   studied   which   can   be   classified   as   ‘acceptable’.   While   FBAC-LSM   was 
significantly preferred over AppArmor and SELinux, there is clearly still room for 
improvement. FBAC-LSM is a much newer, less mature implementation than the other 
two systems studied. Continuing development on FBAC-LSM will incorporate feedback 
from the experiment to further improve its usability. Nonetheless, these results indicate 
that the FBAC model in general is well suited to providing application-oriented controls 
capable of being managed by non-expert users.
5.2 Rate of Policy Enforcement
As described in Section  4.4, FBAC-LSM had the highest success rate in creating 
enforced policies, followed by AppArmor and then SELinux. The variety in rate of policy 
enforcement can be attributed to a number of factors. The successful creation of a policy 
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understanding how to create policies. FBAC-LSM again ranked highest in both respects, 
followed by AppArmor and then SELinux.
One factor that affects policy enforcement is the behaviour of the policy tools for each 
of the systems and the state in which they leave newly created policies. The SELinux 
Policy Generator tool left newly created skeleton policies in permissive mode so that 
users could further develop these policies before manually editing the appropriate file to 
set the domain to be enforced, and then run a shell script to recompile and load the 
policy. Some participants forgot to manually set the policy to be enforced, meaning that 
these policies were not enforced. Several participants reported that they were not 
comfortable with the requirement to run console commands and simply completed what 
they could using the graphical tools available. The result was that the policies were not 
created and assigned to the executables. A more complete graphical tool that steps users 
through the whole process would have improved success using SELinux.
AppArmor’s policy tools left policies either enforced or in complaining mode (which 
is not enforced) depending on user choices. For example, exiting from the Add Profile 
Wizard resulted in the policy left in complaining mode. This resulted in some policies 
being left unenforced, most likely unbeknownst to the user. Making this behaviour more 
obvious to users may have helped decrease the number of programs left unconfined.
FBAC-LSM created policies that were enforced by default unless the user specifically 
toggled the policy activation. This, combined with the wizard for creating policies that 
steps users through the process and the fact that the main window includes information 
about policy enforcement, appear to be factors contributing to the high success rate in 
creating enforced policies.
5.3 Continued Program Operation
Of the cases where policies were in effect, FBAC-LSM allowed the highest percentage of 
programs to continue to run and function. SELinux often did not log all of the access 
attempts required to create a policy that allowed Opera to start. As described on the 
SELinux handout provided to participants, the solution was to set SELinux to log all 
events, which led to the display of a large number of unrelated messages which SELinux 
is normally configured to ignore. While using AppArmor, a number of participants 
created policies that denied access to resources that were required in order for the 
programs to continue to function correctly. This again demonstrates that users frequently 
do not have the expertise required to vet the actions of programs. Because FBAC-LSM 
builds policy using reusable, easily understandable policy abstractions, the required 
access rules were assigned when building the application policies. The study showed that 
this approach clearly led to higher program-feature-access success rates compared with 
requiring users to vet the actions of programs.
As noted in Section 4.5 some FBAC-LSM policies were missing rules for a file that 
did not exist when policy was created. To clarify, this does not imply that all files the 
application will require access to need to pre-exist, just that the parameter automation in 
this case failed to predict the existence of the configuration file. The planned addition of 
a notification feature to FBAC-LSM would address this issue, since this filename can 
already be identified as belonging to the application and a simple interactive prompt 
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5.4 Confinement of Trustworthy Programs 
Considering policies that were successfully created and enforced, all three systems 
performed similarly where the program being confined was acting benevolently during 
policy construction. This result reflects the fact that, when the program is behaving non-
maliciously, adequate protection will be obtained by simply allowing all the rules 
suggested by the learning tools. In this scenario if, at a later point in time, the program is 
compromised or replaced by a malicious version, the user will be protected.
While in this scenario, where enforced policies had been created, FBAC-LSM was 
found to have no significant restriction advantages compared to AppArmor and SELinux, 
further research is required. SELinux makes decisions based on types assigned to files, 
which in the case of the user’s home directory are typically very coarsely grained. It is 
therefore anticipated that, in most cases, user applications will be granted access to 
excessive rights; that is, access to almost anything in the user’s home directory. This 
could be improved by creating more finely-grained SELinux types. Therefore a typical 
SELinux installation is perhaps better suited to improving system-wide user-oriented 
access controls than to application-oriented access controls for programs run by users.
The AppArmor policies created provided slightly tighter controls than those created 
using FBAC-LSM. FBAC-LSM was more permissive due to the high level of network 
access the “Web Browser” functionality authorised in order to allow Active FTP, and a 
policy mistake that granted access to Firefox’s configuration files. The access that was 
granted is illustrated in Appendix B. However, this FBAC-LSM policy abstraction could 
be improved (in one central location) to provide tighter controls for all the policies that 
were created using it. As noted in Section 4.6.2, a large number of those AppArmor 
profiles stopped Opera from running at all, which significantly reduces their usefulness; 
if the security mechanism stops a user’s applications from working, they more likely to 
simply disable the mechanism, and therefore the actual protection provided in practice 
may be lower. Also, this analysis only considered policies that were successfully created 
and enforced, and FBAC-LSM had the highest rate of enforced policies.
Finally, it is important to note that these results are only applicable where the user can 
be  completely   certain  that  an  application  can  be  trusted  at   the  point   of  policy 
construction. In practice this cannot be safely assumed in many cases, for example when 
downloading software. Therefore the ability of users to successfully confine potentially 
malicious programs is arguably more important.
5.5 Confinement of Potentially Malicious Programs
As established in Section  4.6.3, FBAC-LSM was significantly more successful at 
protecting resources from the Trojan horse simulation than AppArmor. Not enough 
participants successfully created policies using SELinux to confine KSirtet to make 
reliable comparisons between all three systems.
As described in Section 3.4.1, when using AppArmor a user will typically run the 
program to be confined, and is then stepped through the process of vetting the learnt rules 
to allow the program to perform the same actions in the future. Using this approach, 
protection from malicious programs is dependent upon users successfully vetting these 
rules. The results of the study demonstrated that typical users, and even security 
professionals and Linux system administrators, generally do not necessarily have the 
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A number of noteworthy examples of the tendency of users to allow malicious activity 
using AppArmor illustrate the extent of this problem:
· 74% of participants who managed to create an enforced policy using AppArmor 
allowed KSirtet to access the shadow file
6. The shadow file is a very high profile 
target that contains the hashed user passwords for the system. With this file a 
malicious program could, for example, attempt dictionary attacks on passwords. 
· 71% granted write access to the hosts file, which could allow the program to 
discretely redirect network traffic and perform man-in-the-middle attacks. 
· 68% granted write access to the  exports  file used to configure network 
shares. This could be used to covertly share the contents of files to remote hosts. 
· 58% granted access to private information in the users Firefox directory, 
potentially including saved web passwords such as those for Internet banking. 
· 68% granted unrestricted network access, allowing the Trojan unlimited scope 
for sending information to, or receiving commands from, the network. 
· 47% allowed the program to insert itself into KDE startup, which allows a 
malicious program to gain a persistent presence on the system.
Any   single   one   of   these   potential   breaches   could   have   very   serious   security 
consequences.   Several   participants   reported   relying   heavily   on   the   severity   level 
suggestions provided by AppArmor, as they did not have the expertise to vet rules based 
on resource names and access types alone. However, many participants reported that the 
severity level metric was ambiguous and often absent. Others seemed to not pay any 
attention to the specifics of the rules at all, simply clicking “Allow” to almost every rule. 
Participants who incorrectly did not notice any suspicious behaviour included ICT PhD 
candidates, security professionals and Linux system administrators. If experienced users 
of this calibre cannot use AppArmor to successfully confine a malicious program, it is 
highly unlikely that typical end users could. Therefore, the results of this study strongly 
indicate that ordinary users cannot reliably employ learning mode application-oriented 
access controls that rely on users vetting generated rules. This result can be generalised to 
other systems such as Systrace, which in addition requires knowledge of system calls (a 
complex interface considered not suited to security mediation [Garfinkel 2003]) in order 
to vet the rules. 
Rules for SELinux modules are typically generated in a similar fashion based on 
program behaviour. Rules are described in terms of access to types rather than specific 
files. SELinux does not currently have a graphical tool to step users through the vetting 
process, which means that vetting is a manual process of editing complex rules that were 
generally not considered easy to understand by participants. As previously mentioned, 
some participants were uncomfortable with the command-line based nature of the 
SELinux tools used to create policy. It is believed that most participants did not edit or 
remove any lines of the rules generated by audit2allow, which created rules based on 
the previous actions of the program. Since this method of generating policy is also based 
on a learning mode and the rules are not easily vetted by users, it is likely that policies 
created by typical users using SELinux would also provide less protection than FBAC-
LSM. Also, as demonstrated by the policy conflict encountered during this study, the 
ineffective default configuration of SELinux can inhibit users from specifying policies to 
6  As previously discussed in Section 3.5, user-oriented access controls were configured to allow 
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enforce their own security goals.
Alternative tool sets exist for managing SELinux policy. However, the tools used were 
the ones that are standard with Fedora (the Linux distribution with the most complete 
SELinux support) and, unlike many SELinux tools, these provided graphical tools to step 
users through some of the process. It is believed that further development could yield 
more usable tools. However, due to the complex nature of the way rules are modelled, 
and the need for vetting the output of learning tools used to create rules for SELinux, it is 
believed that SELinux faces serious obstacles to improving usability. The results of this 
study support the argument that SELinux and its current set of configuration tools is not 
suited to end user configuration to protect themselves against misbehaving software.
FBAC-LSM substantially lowered the risk exposure compared to AppArmor. In each 
case, as  previously described, FBAC-LSM lowers the risk. For example, 6% of 
participants granted access to the shadow, hosts, exports, and private user files 
(compared to 74%, 71%, 68%, and 58% respectively). Furthermore, only 50% allowed 
outgoing network connections, 12% incoming connections (compared to 68% full 
network access with AppArmor), and 19% allowed insertion into KDE startup (compared 
to 47%). Therefore, FBAC-LSM clearly provided the best protection of the systems 
studied. These results are attributable to the design of the FBAC model, which abstracts 
away the low-level privileges that are required in order for applications to provide 
various features. The techniques for automating the discovery of parameter arguments 
also helped the security decisions made by users, allowing them to focus on higher level 
(functionality-based) security goals.
FBAC-LSM was also able to step participants through the process of creating policies 
without requiring users to execute the program being confined. AppArmor and SELinux 
both generally rely on the execution of programs in order to generate rules. It is possible 
to add new rules while enforcing the policy being developed. However, using SELinux or 
AppArmor this can take an extremely large number of iterations to create a working 
policy, as incomplete policies will often cause the program to terminate. Therefore the 
method demonstrated in the preparation videos was to generate the rules while the policy 
was not enforced. This is the approach that is typically used; however, it leaves the 
program unconfined while rules are generated. Therefore, if the program is malicious, it 
could compromise the system while a policy is being developed. The risk of using this 
approach was stressed, and participants were encouraged to take the more restrictive 
approach, although few did. Furthermore, the few more experienced users who were 
observed attempting to take the safer approach were still ultimately unsuccessful at 
creating policies which restricted malicious activity. As discussed in the introduction, 
there are many reasons not to trust software and therefore it is recommended to avoid 
these learning modes. FBAC-LSM provides an alternative approach to policy creation 
that avoids these risks, since policies are specified without executing the programs being 
confined. Note that the potential risk exposure during learning was not considered when 
assessing risk levels of the policies created during the study.
5.6 Overall Protection
Factors contributing to the overall risk exposure score include the success rate of creating 
policies and ensuring policies are enforced (as discussed in Section 4.4), the extent to 
which the legitimately behaving program (Opera) was restricted, and the extent to which Empowering End Users to Confine Their Own Applications            0: ●  
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the malicious program (the KSirtet Trojan) was restricted. The overall risk exposure 
score reflects the practical security-benefit of each system by measuring the extent that 
users are protected from misbehaving programs accessing sensitive resources. 
As described in Section 4.6.1, FBAC-LSM had significantly lower overall risk 
exposures. This result can be attributed to the fact that the highest number of users were 
successful in creating policies, ensuring policies were enforced, and confining the Trojan 
simulation using FBAC-LSM.
5.7 Limitations of the Study
The primary limitation of this study was the SELinux KSirtet policy conflict, which 
excluded some results from a large number of participants from analysis. As discussed 
previously, existing SELinux rules for KSirtet prevented new rules from being enforced. 
Due to the abstruseness of the output from the SELinux command-line tools, participants 
were unaware that their new policies were not in effect. When this was detected, the 
VMWare   image   was   modified   to   remove   this   conflict   for   the   nine   subsequent 
participants. Data from the previous participants regarding KSirtet was not included in 
analysis. As noted previously, the conflicting SELinux policy (included in the games 
policy module) did not provide any protection against the malicious activities attempted 
by the Trojan horse simulation.
The FBAC-LSM implementation is relatively new compared with the other two 
schemes and occasionally caused crashes, requiring the VM to be restarted. While no 
policies that had been created were lost, this bug may have impacted the time-on-task 
measurement, and also potentially negatively affected participants’ perceptions of the 
system. However, the results suggest that any such effect was not a significant one.
5.8 Conclusions
Developing usable security software has long been acknowledged as a challenge that has 
not been given sufficient  attention  [Zurko and Simon 1996]. Application-oriented 
controls have the potential to improve security but pose new usability problems that, until 
recently, had not been considered [DeWitt and Kuljis 2006]. In particular, achieving 
sufficiently finely grained protection without exposing end users to complex low-level 
details of the application's operation has remained problematic.
This paper presents the results of a study into the usability and security outcomes of 
three different approaches to application confinement. SELinux provides a mature and 
technically robust framework. However, due to its complex model and poor usability of 
its existing tools, the study showed it to have a low success rate. SELinux tools need 
significant work in order to be usable by end users. In the mean time SELinux seems to 
be better suited to enforcing system-wide policies constructed and managed by experts.
In contrast, AppArmor is relatively easy to learn. However, the security decisions 
made during policy construction still require expertise beyond that of most users. In 
particular, policies generated using the system's learning mode cannot be relied upon 
unless the user manually verifies these are correct. Not only is this process time-
consuming, it often requires expertise that end users are unlikely to have. This was 
clearly shown in the study by the relatively low success of AppArmor in confining the 
KSirtet Trojan. This study therefore demonstrates that policy generating learning modes 
are not a viable method for end users to successfully confine their applications.
However, the results showed end user construction and management of protective 0: 26 ● Z.C. Schreuders, T. McGill, and C. Payne
application confinement policies was indeed feasible. The study demonstrated that the 
FBAC model can be effectively employed by end users with limited technical expertise 
to protect themselves against both vulnerabilities in otherwise trustworthy software and 
potentially malicious programs. These results also clearly indicated the large practical 
impact usability has on security. The hierarchical nature of the policy abstractions used 
by FBAC avoids the need for end users to deal with low-level platform complexities, 
while still achieving a very high level of confinement. In comparative terms, FBAC-LSM 
was markedly superior to both AppArmor and SELinux in creating policies, ensuring 
policies were enforced, allowing programs to function correctly while confined and the 
protection achieved from malicious code. The FBAC LSM implementation was also 
preferred by study participants for usability and time efficiency.
Therefore, although the FBAC model is a relatively new approach to application-
oriented access control, the results of this study are highly encouraging in pointing the 
way forward to the use of functionality-based schemes that empower non-expert end 
users to confine their applications and protect themselves from a variety of prevalent 
security threats.
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APPENDIX A – TASK SCENARIOS
Scenario 1: Opera
You use the Opera web browser for chatting online (using IRC), downloading files, and 
to browse web pages. You are concerned that since it often interacts with external servers 
you should confine it in case there are any exploitable vulnerabilities in opera.
Command to run: opera
To find the path used, open a console and type: which opera
Tips:
You may want to create a new directory in your home directory for downloads
There is a webpage at: www.murdoch.edu.au
There is an IRC server at: 134.115.65.115 with a chat room named #chat
Scenario 2: KSirtet
You have just downloaded and installed a game from the Internet. It is similar to the 
classic game Tetris. Since this game was downloaded from an unauthenticated website 
you decide to confine the program.
Command to run: ksirtet
To find the path used, open a console and type: which ksirtet
APPENDIX B – RISK EXPOSURE
Table VI illustrates the mean number of security sensitive resources that were left in a 
state where Opera is authorised to access various security sensitive resources. This 
information is organised in terms of categories of resource (that is, the type of security 
risk they present).  This includes VMs that did not have enforced  policies. This 
information shows the practical impact of each security system. For each security system 
the table shows the portion of participants’ VMs that were left in a state which allowed 
the program to access the specified resource.  Table VII  shows the same type of 
information for KSirtet; again including VMs without enforced policies. 
Table VI: Mean authorisation granted to Opera to access categories of resources
Access to category of 
resource (Opera)
SELinux 
(n=31)
AppArmor 
(n=38)
FBAC-LSM
(n=39)
System   misconfiguration 
information leak (MAX: 3) 2.45 1.03 0.31Empowering End Users to Confine Their Own Applications            0: ●  
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Access to category of 
resource (Opera)
SELinux 
(n=31)
AppArmor 
(n=38)
FBAC-LSM
(n=39)
System   misconfiguration 
compromise (MAX: 5) 3.87 1.71 0.51
System   information   leak 
(MAX: 2) 1.81 1.13 0.23
Local privacy (MAX: 1) 0.77 0.37 0.97
Local compromise (MAX: 3) 2.61 1.03 0.92
Temporary   file   creation 
(MAX: 1) 0.81 0.61 0.97
Network ingress (MAX: 2) 1.61 1.58 2.00
Network egress (MAX: 3) 2.52 2.37 3.00
Execute   commands   using 
bash (MAX: 3) 2.32 1.03 0.51
The FBAC-LSM functionalities deployed for the experiment contained a mistake in 
the Web_Browser functionality which granted undue access to Firefox’s files (the “local 
privacy” row for Opera in  Table VI). Also, the liberal access to network access (as 
demonstrated in the “network ingress” and “network egress” rows for Opera in Table VI) 
is due to the FTP_Client functionality which grants this access to allow Active FTP 
which requires extensive network access. Also, FBAC-LSM does not restrict access to 
files   in   /tmp   (the   “temporary   file   creation”   rows   in  the   two   tables   above).   As 
demonstrated in Table VI and Table VII, in all other 13 categories FBAC-LSM provided 
the tightest restrictions.
Table VII: Mean authorisation granted to KSirtet to access categories of resources
Access to category of 
resource (KSirtet)
SELinux
(n=9)
AppArmor
(n=38)
FBAC-LSM
(n=39)
System   misconfiguration 
information leak (MAX: 3) 3.00 2.21 0.69
System   misconfiguration 
compromise (MAX: 5) 4.89 3.47 1.03
System   information   leak 
(MAX: 2) 2.00 1.53 0.41
Local privacy (MAX: 4) 3.89 2.32 0.82
Local compromise (MAX: 3) 2.67 1.37 0.64
Temporary   file   creation 
(MAX: 1) 0.89 0.68 0.97
Network ingress (MAX: 2) 1.78 1.37 0.56
Network egress (MAX: 6) 5.33 4.11 3.54
Execute   commands   using 
bash (MAX: 3) 2.67 0.97 0.590: 30 ● Z.C. Schreuders, T. McGill, and C. Payne
APPENDIX C – EXPOSURE SCORING
Table VIII lists all the resources the scoring program assessed and illustrates the number 
of VMs which were left in a state where Opera was authorised to access various security 
sensitive resources. This included VMs which did not have enforced policies. For each 
security system the table shows the number of participants’ VMs which were left in a 
state which allowed the program to access the specified resource. For example, the 10th 
row shows how many of the policies which were created successfully protect the contents 
of the shadow file from Opera. Of the FBAC-LSM VMs 10% allow this inappropriate 
access, compared to 34% of the AppArmor VMs, and 77% of the SELinux VMs.
Table VIII: Authorisation granted to Opera to access resources which pose security risks
Access to resource (Opera) SELinux
(n=31)
AppArmor 
(n=38)
FBAC-LSM
(n=39)
/etc/sysctl.conf r 28 (90%) 13 (34%) 4 (10%)
/etc/group r 28 (90%) 30 (79%) 5 (13%)
/etc/login.defs rw 24 (77%) 13 (34%) 4 (10%)
/etc/inittab rw 24 (77%) 13 (34%) 4 (10%)
$HOME/.mozilla/firefox/X.default/ 
formhistory.dat r
24 (77%) 14 (37%) 38 (97%)
/tmp/JsXr.c w 25 (81%) 23 (61%) 38 (97%)
$HOME/.kde/Autostart/ksirtet w 27 (87%) 13 (34%) 12 (31%)
$HOME/Desktop/ksirtet.desktop w 27 (87%) 13 (34%) 12 (31%)
$HOME/.rhosts w 27 (87%) 13 (34%) 12 (31%)
/etc/shadow r 24 (77%) 13 (34%) 4 (10%)
/etc/ssh/sshd_config r 28 (90%) 13 (34%) 4 (10%)
/etc/gshadow r 24 (77%) 13 (34%) 4 (10%)
/etc/exports rw 24 (77%) 13 (34%) 4 (10%)
/etc/hosts rw 24 (77%) 13 (34%) 4 (10%)
/etc/logrotate.conf rw 24 (77%) 13 (34%) 4 (10%)
TCP 22 gateway.murdoch.edu.au 25 (81%) 30 (79%) 39 (100%)
TCP 995 www.mail.murdoch.edu.au  25 (81%) 30 (79%) 39 (100%)
UDP 1050 murdoch.edu.au 28 (90%) 30 (79%) 39 (100%)
TCP 5000 25 (81%) 30 (79%) 39 (100%)
UDP 5000 25 (81%) 30 (79%) 39 (100%)
netcat -h 2>&1 24 (77%) 13 (34%) 4 (10%)
2>&1 echo \"main(){printf(\\\"hello\\n\\\");}\" > 
"HOMEDIR" JsXr2.c
24 (77%) 13 (34%) 12 (31%)
gcc "HOMEDIR" JsXr2.c -o "HOMEDIR"JsXr 
2>&1
24 (77%) 13 (34%) 4 (10%)Empowering End Users to Confine Their Own Applications            0: ●  
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Table IX shows the same type of information for KSirtet; again including VMs without 
enforced policies. The table lists all the resources the Trojan horse simulation attempted 
to access. KSirtet is allowed to access the shadow file with 23% of the FBAC-LSM VMs, 
compared to 74% of the AppArmor VMs, and 100% of the SELinux VMs. The 
differences in overall risk exposure are analysed in the following section.
Table IX: Authorisation granted to KSirtet to access resources which pose security risks
Access to resource (KSirtet) SELinux
(n=9)
AppArmor
(n=38)
FBAC-LSM
(n=39)
/etc/sysctl.conf r 9 (100%) 28 (74%) 8 (21%)
/etc/group r 9 (100%) 30 (79%) 8 (21%)
/etc/login.defs rw 9 (100%) 27 (71%) 7 (18%)
/etc/inittab rw 9 (100%) 24 (63%) 7 (18%)
$HOME/.opera/typed_history.xml r 9 (100%) 22 (58%) 8 (21%)
$HOME/.opera/global.dat r 9 (100%) 22 (58%) 8 (21%)
$HOME/.opera/wand.dat r 9 (100%) 22 (58%) 8 (21%)
$HOME/.mozilla/firefox/we6ybhyi.default/formhi
story.dat r
8 (89%) 22 (58%) 8 (21%)
/tmp/JsXr.c w 8 (89%) 26 (68%) 38 (97%)
$HOME/.kde/Autostart/ksirtet w 8 (89%) 18 (47%) 12 (31%)
$HOME/Desktop/ksirtet.desktop w 8 (89%) 18 (47%) 6 (15%)
$HOME/.rhosts w 8 (89%) 16 (42%) 7 (18%)
/etc/shadow r 9 (100%) 28 (74%) 9 (23%)
/etc/ssh/sshd_config r 9 (100%) 27 (71%) 9 (23%)
/etc/gshadow r 9 (100%) 29 (76%) 9 (23%)
/etc/exports rw 9 (100%) 26 (68%) 9 (23%)
/etc/hosts rw 8 (89%) 27 (71%) 9 (23%)
/etc/logrotate.conf rw 9 (100%) 28 (74%) 8 (21%)
TCP 80 murdoch.edu.au 8 (89%) 26 (68%) 23 (59%)
TCP 22 gateway.murdoch.edu.au 8 (89%) 26 (68%) 23 (59%)
TCP 995 www.mail.murdoch.edu.au 8 (89%) 26 (68%) 23 (59%)
TCP 443 murdoch.edu.au 8 (89%) 26 (68%) 23 (59%)
UDP 53 murdoch.edu.au 8 (89%) 26 (68%) 23 (59%)
UDP 1050 murdoch.edu.au 8 (89%) 26 (68%) 23 (59%)
TCP 5000 8 (89%) 26 (68%) 11 (28%)
UDP 5000 8 (89%) 26 (68%) 11 (28%)
netcat -h 2>&1 8 (89%) 10 (26%) 8 (21%)
2>&1 echo \"main(){printf(\\\"hello\\n\\\");}\" > 
"HOMEDIR"JsXr2.c
8 (89%) 16 (42%) 7 (18%)
gcc   "HOMEDIR"JsXr2.c   -o   "HOMEDIR"JsXr 
2>&1
8 (89%) 11 (29%) 8 (21%)